LA CLASSE CHE PUR DI DISTRUGGERE LE CLASSI MEDIE E LE CLASSI LAVORATRICI HA DECISO CHE E' MEGLIO L'AUTODISTRUZIONE O IL TUTTO PER TUTTO

 

A new world is dawning, and the US will no longer lead it

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, center, speaks with U.S. President Donald Trump, at the contentious G7 Leaders Summit in Canada in June. AP/Jesco Denzel/German Federal Government

A new world is dawning, and the US will no longer lead it

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From pulling out of treaties to denigrating allies to starting trade wars, the impulsive actions of President Donald Trump are upending the international order that has been in place since the end of World War II.

But even before Trump’s belligerent foreign policy positions, America had been gradually losing its dominant role in world affairs.

A power shift among the nations of the world began at the end of the Cold War and has been accelerating this century.

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It is not as simple as saying “America is in decline,” since America remains a powerful country. But American global power has been eroding for some time, as I argue in the Foreign Policy Association’s “Great Decisions 2018” volume. The power of other countries has grown, giving them both the ability and the desire to effect global affairs independently of U.S. desires.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: ‘We are the indispensable nation.’ AP/Joe Marquette

I am a foreign policy scholar and practitioner who has studied U.S. foreign policy through many administrations. I believe this global trend spells the end of the “exceptional nation” Americans imagined they were since the nation was founded and the end of the American era of global domination that began 70 years ago. We are no longer the “indispensable” nation celebrated by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the end of the last century.

Pax Americana no more

Since the end of WWII, the U.S. has been the central player in the international system, leading in the creation of new international organizations like the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

American diplomacy has been essential to multinational agreements on trade, climate, regional security and arms control. Americans could and did claim to be at the center of a “rules-based international order.”

Those days are gone.

Not only do China and Russia contest America’s global role, a growing number of other countries are asserting an independent and increasingly influential role in regional economic and security developments.

Neither American political party has come to grips with this sea change. Until they do, U.S. global actions are likely to be less effective, even counterproductive.

Who’s on top?

The power shifts are increasingly visible. In the Middle East, the U.S. hoped for decades to isolate Iran as a pariah and weaken the regime until it fell.

Today, that goal is unimaginable, though national security adviser John Bolton continues to imagine it.

Iran is and will remain an increasingly assertive and influential power in the region, defending and promoting its interests and competing with the Saudi regime.

The Russians are in the Middle East region for good, building on their long-standing relationship with the family of Syria’s dictator.

Turkey, a rising regional power, acts increasingly independent of the preferences of the U.S., its NATO ally, playing its own hand in the regional power game.

The U.S. helped unleash these trends with the strategically fatal invasion of Iraq in 2003 – fatal, because it permanently removed a regional leader who balanced the power of Iran. The failure to create a stable Iraq stimulated regional religious and political conflicts and rendered ineffective subsequent U.S. efforts to influence current trends in the region, as the continually ineffective policies in Syria show.

U.S. Army helicopter crew chief in Afghanistan. Capt. Brian Harris, U.S. Army via AP

In Asia, decades of U.S. condemnation and efforts to contain the rise of Chinese power have failed. An assertive China has risen.

China now plays almost as powerful a role in the global economy as the U.S. It has defended an authoritarian model for economic growth, armed artificial islands in the South China Sea, and built a military base in Djibouti. China has created new multilateral organizations for security discussions and one for infrastructure loans, which the U.S. declined to join. It has developed a global lending program – the Belt and Road Initiative – and has stepped into a stronger global role on climate change. And China is spreading its political and economic influence into Africa and Latin America.

The U.S. cannot slow Chinese economic growth nor contain its power. China is changing the rules, whether the U.S. likes it or not.

Elsewhere in Asia, Japan moves toward a renewed nationalism and has removed restrictions on its defense spending and the deployment of its military in the face of growing Chinese power.

North Korea behaves more and more like a regional power, winning a direct meeting with the U.S. president while making only a general commitment to denuclearize. The prospect of a unified Korea would bring into being another major regional power center in the Northern Pacific.

Other countries, like the Philippines and Australia, hedge their bets by improving bilateral relations with China. And India is a growing economic and military presence in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.

Nor will the U.S. contain the rise of Russia, whose government poisons its citizens overseas and kills dissenters at home. At the same time, Russia is rebuilding its military and intruding in others’ elections. The Russian regime is threatening its near neighbors and actively engaging in the Middle East.

President Vladimir Putin asserts Russia’s interests and role in the world, like any other great power. Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the power of the United States, with some success.

Military power, the American global trump card, is not as useful a tool as it once was.

While the U.S. continues to have the world’s only global military capability, able to deploy anywhere, it is no longer evident that this capability effectively sustains U.S. leadership. Clear military victories are few – the Gulf War in 1991 being an exception. The endless U.S. deployment in Afghanistan carries the whiff of Vietnam in its inability to resolve that country’s civil war.

Meanwhile, the militaries of other countries, acting independently of the U.S., are proving effective, as both Turkish and Iranian operations in Syria suggest.

Abroad at home

The transition to this new era is proving difficult for American policy-makers.

The Trump “America First” foreign policy is based on the view that the U.S. needs to defend its interests by acting alone, eschewing or withdrawing from multilateral arrangements for trade, economics, diplomacy or security.

Trump praises “strong” nationalistic leadership in authoritarian countries, while democratic leadership in allied countries is criticized as weak.

In response, allies distance themselves from the United States. Others are emboldened to act in an equally nationalistic and assertive way.

The leaders of Russia and Turkey are strengthening ties. AP/Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool

Some conservatives, like Sen. John McCain, call for confrontation with Russia and strengthening traditional American alliances, particularly NATO.

Others, like John Bolton, call for regime change in assertive powers like Iran.

Liberals and many Democrats criticize Trump for alienating traditional allies like Canada, France and Germany while befriending dictators. Policy-makers once critical of confrontational policies now condemn Trump for failing to confront Russia and China.

A different president in Washington, D.C., will not restore the “rules-based” international order. The underlying changes in global power relations have already undermined that order.

A neo-conservative foreign policy, featuring unilateral American military intervention, as favored by John Bolton, will only accelerate the global shift. Liberal internationalists like Hillary Clinton would fail as well, because the rest of the world rejects the assumption that the U.S. is “indispensable” and “exceptional.” Barack Obama appeared to recognize the changing reality, but continued to argue that only the U.S. could lead the international system.

America will need to learn new rules and play differently in the new balance-of-power world, where others have assets and policies the U.S. does not and cannot control.

TUTTI LO SANNO, MA DRAGHI, CONTE, DI MAIO E CORTI CELESTI IMBELLI CONTINUANO A FAR FINTA DI NULLA

Study: U.S. No Longer Dominant Power in the Pacific

America would struggle to win – and may even lose – a war with China, according to an Australian think tank.

U.S. News & World Report

Study: U.S. No Longer Dominant in the Pacific

AT SEA - MARCH 8: In this handout photo provided by the U.S. Navy, the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer (LHD 4) transits the East Sea on March 8, 2016 during Exercise Ssang Yong 2016. Ssang Yong 16 is a biennial combined amphibious exercise conducted by forward-deployed U.S. forces with the Republic of Korea Navy and Marine Corps, Australian Army and Royal New Zealand Army Forces. (Photo by MCSN Craig Z. Rodarte/U.S. Navy via Getty Images)

The USS Boxer transits the East Sea on in 2016. A new study speculates the U.S. could lose a war in the Pacific, as China invests heavily in particular aspects of its military.Craig Z. Rodarte/U.S. Navy/Getty Images

The U.S. is no longer the dominant power in the western Pacific and would struggle to win a conflict against China, according to a new study from an Australian institute.

A combination of overly stretched budgets, underprepared forces and outdated thinking among war planners would undercut America's ability to defeat China, particularly as Beijing invests heavily in particular aspects of its military, a study from the University of Sidney's United States Studies Centre states. It speculates the U.S. could lose a war before it starts if, for example, China were to launch a wide-scale, coordinated missile attack against U.S. and allied bases.

"The United States might fail to deter — or could even lose — a limited war with China, with devastating consequences for the region's future strategic landscape," the study's authors write.

Meeting the challenge will require hard choices that leaders in the U.S. may be unwilling or unable to make, they write, particularly if Washington continues to see itself as the global guarantor of "an expansive liberal order."

"In an era of constrained budgets and multiplying geopolitical flashpoints, prioritising great power competition with China means America's armed forces must scale back other global responsibilities."

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The study follows fears from within U.S. defense and political circles in recent months that decades of focus on Middle East terrorism threats and outdated fears about Russia have left America wrong-footed in preparing for a potential conflict with China. The study recommends further relying on traditional allies, including Japan and Australia, though those alliances have strained under the Trump administration's skepticism about such partnerships and insistence that allies contribute more resources and money to working with the U.S.

It points out that Congress has allocated special budgets to help military planners address threats in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe, though no such investment exists for East and South Asia.

Later on Tuesday, President Donald Trump was asked about the study's assertion that China possess a strategic edge over the U.S.

"We could wipe out anything," he said, adding the U.S. has "the most powerful military in the world."

Trump said he believes no country can compare to American military might, and speculated that China would "pay a price they don't want to pay" if the country were to attack U.S. interests.

The study is not the first to highlight such concerns. A commission formed by Congress to analyze the policy document that guides U.S. national security thinking and operations concluded in November that the U.S. is no longer clearly superior to the threats it faces around the world and that it would struggle to win wars against China or Russia.

"U.S. military superiority is no longer assured and the implications for American interests and American security are severe," the National Defense Strategy Commission wrote in its findings at the time. It attributed the weakened defense infrastructure to "political dysfunction and decisions made by both major parties."

China, meanwhile, has found efficient ways to counter or exploit U.S. military weaknesses. Its decision to reform its coast guard as a military service last year raised sharp concern among Pentagon leaders, concerned about the unclear boundary between China's foreign military operations and other encounters – such as its annexation of islands and reefs in international waters – that Beijing could frame as a domestic dispute.

L'ITALIA E' IN PIENA DECADENZA DA PIU' DI DUE DECENNI E SI E' MESSA CON LE PALLE AD ENTRAMBI I PIEDI DA SOLA

 

America losing the future to China

If US inattention to R&D continues to abet China's rise to high-tech dominance, Beijing's military threat will grow as well

China has sent up several remote-sensing satellites in the Yaogan series and more launches are set for this year. Photo: Handout
China has launched several remote-sensing satellites in the Yaogan series. Photo: Handout


Few Americans realize it, but their country’s dominance in high-tech innovation is now in question. This is something that Google’s former chief executive officer, Eric Schmidt, acknowledged in his recent testimony before Congress.

Meanwhile, Elon Musk has stated that China will become the world’s premier economy and world power, in large part because of Beijing’s consistent investment in high-tech innovation.

Whether it be artificial intelligence or space technology, China is rapidly becoming a dominant player in high-tech development. As these trends intensify over the next decade, China’s military threat to the United States will naturally increase as well.

At the end of February, for example, China surprised Western intelligence services with the sudden launch of a trio of Yaogan-31 satellites. As US Senator Gary Peters, a Democratic member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, noted, this was the third launch since January 31 – a clear indication that China’s capabilities are rapidly catching up to those of the United States.

As China’s capabilities match – and inevitably surpass – those of the US military, Washington will find itself pushed out of the Indo-Pacific region and its status as the world’s only superpower will have been erased.

The Yaogan constellation was inaugurated in 2006, with the launch of China’s first Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite for constant, all-weather imaging of the Earth. A year later, the constellation’s first optical satellite was deployed.

By 2009, the first trio of Yaogan electronic-reconnaissance satellites was added to the growing constellation.

Most experts believe that the Yaogan satellite constellation is akin to the US Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS). These satellites intercept radio signals from the ground and use them to triangulate and track the position of warships at sea. 

This is an essential evolution in China’s growing naval and space capabilities. Yaogan will allow China’s rapidly modernizing military to threaten increasingly vulnerable American military units operating near China.

The key strategic aim for China is to deter US military intervention into the Indo-Pacific. The Yaogan satellite constellation’s ability to track and target US naval assets is essential for China’s growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. 

In fact, Beijing has taken extraordinary steps to protect the Yaogan constellation itself from American anti-satellite (ASAT) attack. 

In 2018, a small co-orbital satellite was deployed alongside one of the surveillance satellites of the Yaogan constellation. No one knows what the co-orbital satellite’s mission was. My colleague Brian G Chow has nicknamed these co-orbital satellites “space stalkers.” In peacetime, these tiny and maneuverable systems can be used to repair larger satellites remotely. In wartime, however, they can be fashioned into devastating space weapons. 

Space stalkers could serve as bodyguards for sensitive satellites like those in the Yaogan constellation. These bodyguards could deflect American ASAT attacks against satellites belonging to the Yaogan constellation. This would keep the Yaogan constellation operating in a war with the United States, increasing China’s threat to US military forces in the Indo-Pacific region.

Many American strategists believe that as China becomes more reliant on satellites over the next decade, the US Armed Forces will be able to hold China hostage by threatening these vulnerable satellite constellations. Yet the presence of space stalkers among sensitive Chinese satellite constellations indicates an added layer of protection that American systems otherwise lack. Therefore, deterrence will be difficult to impose from Washington. And China will still possess an asymmetrical advantage. 

China needs systems like the Yaogan satellite constellation to keep the US military just over the horizon in the Indo-Pacific. The harder it is for the United States to deploy forces reliably to stop a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan or possibly to fight Chinese forces in the South or East China Seas, the greater the advantage Beijing enjoys over Washington.

Yet China’s growing military capabilities have only occurred because the United States prematurely surrendered in the race for high-tech development.

As David P Goldman outlines in his recent book, while the United States has grown complacent, Beijing has identified key strategic industries that they want China to capture. By capturing high-tech fields like those of quantum computing, space technology, biotech, or artificial intelligence, China will become the center of the world. 

Once China is the source of innovation for the new industrial revolution, its military will naturally grow in capabilities. Beijing will finally have the means with which to threaten the United States. By threatening the US militarily, Beijing could force fundamental changes to the international order that has long favored America. 

With each new development, China’s strategic threat to the United States grows. Over time, as per Beijing’s design, the balance of power will shift in China’s favor º and that balance is unlikely to shift back, as China becomes the center of the new high-tech industrial revolution.

America must create a long-term strategy for high-tech research and development before China leapfrogs the United States technologically in the next decade, not only becoming the world’s largest economy but eventually surpassing the US military. 

If a federal R&D strategy is not developed and implemented soon, the US will lose the future to China, just as both Eric Schmidt and David Goldman fear. As Donald Rumsfeld once said, “We are on notice, but we have not noticed.” 

Here’s to hoping Washington notices soon.

Brandon J Weichert

Brandon J Weichert is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower. He is a geopolitical analyst who manages The Weichert Report: World News Done Right. His work appears regularly in The Washington Times and Real Clear Politics. Weichert is a former US congressional staffer who holds an MA in statecraft and national security affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC, and is an associate member of New College, Oxford University.

TUTTI LO SANNO, ECCETTO DI MAIO, CONTE, DRAGHI, MOZZARELLA E ALTRE RINFUSE SPARSE ... MA TUTTI FANNO FINTA DI NULLA, SPECULANDO SULLA PROPRIA SOPRAVVIVENZA POLITICA SULLE SPALLE DI CHI MANDERANNO A COMBATTERE PER LORO STAVOLTA

 

The US dollar’s hegemony is looking fragile

The modernisation of China’s exchange-rate system could deal the currency a painful blow

New $5 bills straight from the print works in Washington DC.
New $5 bills straight from the print works in Washington DC. Photograph: Gary Cameron/Reuters
Fri 2 Apr 2021 08.00 BST

The mighty US dollar continues to reign supreme in global markets. But the greenback’s dominance may well be more fragile than it appears, because expected future changes in China’s exchange-rate regime are likely to trigger a significant shift in the international monetary order.

For many reasons, the Chinese authorities will probably someday stop pegging the renminbi to a basket of currencies, and shift to a modern inflation-targeting regime under which they allow the exchange rate to fluctuate much more freely, especially against the dollar. When that happens, expect most of Asia to follow China. In due time, the dollar, currently the anchor currency for roughly two-thirds of world GDP, could lose nearly half its weight.

Considering how much the United States relies on the dollar’s special status – or what then-French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously called America’s “exorbitant privilege” – to fund massive public and private borrowing, the impact of such a shift could be significant. Given that the US has been aggressively using deficit financing to combat the economic ravages of COVID-19, the sustainability of its debt might be called into question.

The long-standing argument for a more flexible Chinese currency is that China is simply too big to let its economy dance to the US Federal Reserve’s tune, even if Chinese capital controls provide some measure of insulation. China’s GDP (measured at international prices) surpassed that of the US back in 2014 and is still growing far faster than the US and Europe, making the case for greater exchange-rate flexibility increasingly compelling.

A more recent argument is that the dollar’s centrality gives the US government too much access to global transactions information. This is also a major concern in Europe. In principle, dollar transactions could be cleared anywhere in the world, but US banks and clearing houses have a significant natural advantage, because they can be implicitly (or explicitly) backed by the Fed, which has unlimited capacity to issue currency in a crisis. In comparison, any dollar clearing house outside the US will always be more subject to crises of confidence – a problem with which even the eurozone has struggled.

Moreover, former US President Donald Trump’s policies to check China’s trade dominance are not going away anytime soon. This is one of the few issues on which Democrats and Republicans broadly agree, and there is little question that trade deglobalization undermines the dollar.

Chinese policymakers face many obstacles in trying to break away from the current renminbi peg. But, in characteristic style, they have slowly been laying the groundwork on many fronts. China has been gradually allowing foreign institutional investors to buy renminbi bonds, and in 2016, the International Monetary Fund added the renminbi to the basket of major currencies that determines the value of Special Drawing Rights (the IMF’s global reserve asset).

In addition, the People’s Bank of China is far ahead of other major central banks in developing a central-bank digital currency. Although currently purely for domestic use, the PBOC’s digital currency ultimately will facilitate the renminbi’s international use, especially in countries that gravitate toward China’s eventual currency bloc. This will give the Chinese government a window into digital renminbi users’ transactions, just as the current system gives the US a great deal of similar information.

Will other Asian countries indeed follow China? The US will certainly push hard to keep as many economies as possible orbiting around the dollar, but it will be an uphill battle. Just as the US eclipsed Britain at the end of the nineteenth century as the world’s largest trading country, China long ago surpassed America by the same measure.

True, Japan and India may go their own way. But if China makes the renminbi more flexible, they will likely at the very least give the currency a weight comparable to that of the dollar in their foreign-exchange reserves.

There are striking parallels between Asia’s close alignment with the dollar today and the situation in Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. But that era ended with high inflation and the collapse of the post-war Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Most of Europe then recognized that intra-European trade was more important than trade with the US. This led to the emergence of a Deutsche Mark bloc that decades later morphed into the single currency, the euro.

This does not mean that the Chinese renminbi will become the global currency overnight. Transitions from one dominant currency to another can take a long time. During the two decades between World Wars I and II, for example, the new entrant, the dollar, had roughly the same weight in central-bank reserves as the British pound, which had been the dominant global currency for more than a century following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s.

So, what is wrong with three world currencies – the euro, the renminbi, and the dollar – sharing the spotlight? Nothing, except that neither markets nor policymakers seem remotely prepared for such a transition. US government borrowing rates would almost certainly be affected, though the really big impact might fall on corporate borrowers, especially small and medium-size firms.

Today, it seems to be an article of faith among US policymakers and many economists that the world’s appetite for dollar debt is virtually insatiable. But a modernization of China’s exchange-rate arrangements could deal the dollar’s status a painful blow.

Kenneth Rogoff is professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University. He was the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund from 2001 to 2003.



  • LA MICCIA E' ACCESA DA ANNI ... ED E' REALE

     

    Singapore PM: 'Considerable risk' of severe US-China tensions

    By Karishma Vaswani
    Asia business correspondent

    Published

    media captionSingapore's PM is concerned over superpower tensions

    Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has told the BBC that a clash between the US and China is more likely than it was five years ago.

    However, he maintained that the odds of military conflict are "not yet high".

    The prime minister said if both nations continue to take a hard line because of domestic considerations, they could easily find themselves at an impasse.

    The Biden administration will hold its first high-level talks with Chinese officials in Alaska next week.

    Mr Lee was reluctant to give advice to China but noted its political direction had sparked tensions with nations big and small.

    "There is significant uncertainty [and] anxiety over which way China is going and whether this will be good for them," he told BBC World News' Talking Business Asia programme.

    "I do not think that is in China's interest."

    The Singaporean leader's views on the US-China relationship are often sought, as the tiny island nation plays an outsized role economically and in terms of political influence in the region.

    The US is a major security partner for the city state and is also the biggest investor in Singapore, far out-stripping any other country's contribution.

    Meanwhile, China is Singapore's largest export market and, like much of Asia, Singapore's economy has benefited from China's rise.

    US-China trade war

    The bitter trade war between the two superpowers over the last two years has threatened this delicate balance.

    It started during former US President Donald Trump's time in office, but there's been no indication that newly-elected President Joe Biden will take a softer approach with China.

    Prime Minister Lee said he hoped the new American leader would be someone who "believes in multilateralism and international trade".

    He also addressed the tussle for global dominance between the two.

    "The US is still number one but number two [China] is not so far behind," he said. "That is what is difficult for the US to accept."

    By some estimates, the Chinese economy is slated to overtake the US to become the world's largest by 2028, five years earlier than previously forecast.

    China's remarkable economic rise has in recent years been accompanied by increasing aggression both internally and externally under leader Xi Jinping.

    Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong speaks exclusively with the BBC's Karishma Vaswani.image copyrightPrime Minsiter's Office
    image captionSingapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong speaks exclusively with the BBC's Karishma Vaswani

    China's rise

    That has led to condemnation of its actions by many in the West and concern among some partners in Asia.

    Despite this, Prime Minister Lee said Singapore could not afford to take sides.

    "It is a problem for many countries, which is why we are all hoping and encouraging the two large powers to think very carefully before deciding that the other one is an adversary which has to be kept down, if not put down," he said.

    "What we would like to see is China being a country where its prosperity, development and growing strength is welcomed by other countries in the world, who see this as an opportunity for them to prosper together and live in a stable world together."

    The deterioration in US-China ties is taking place against the backdrop of the pandemic and a backlash against globalisation, an economic trend that has helped Singapore become one of the richest countries in Asia.

    Prime Minister Lee believes globalisation still has much going for it, especially given the need to cooperate on vaccines.

    "You cannot avoid working with one another because to go back to where you were... lies poverty and despair and probably instability and conflict," he said.

    Post-pandemic travel

    Closer to home, one of the key priorities for Singapore is to open borders and find a way for tourists to return to the trade and travel-dependent nation.

    The prime minister suggested vaccination passports could be part of that process but warned it would be some time before international travel returned to pre-pandemic levels.

    "It will not be like before where you can just buy a ticket, hop onto the plane and go off to Hong Kong, Bangkok or Bali for a weekend or a casual holiday," he said.

    "Hopefully by the end of this year or next year the doors can start to open, if not earlier."

    CHE COSA SUCCEDE AGLI USA ED ALL'EUROPA SE GLI USA PERDONO ANCHE LA GUERRA CON LA CINA, DOPO AVERE PERSO IN AFGHANISTAN ED IN IRAK?

     

    American overreach in Anchorage points to conflict with China

    It’s fantasy to think that the US can still lay down the law as it attempted to in Alaska. Avoiding a Pacific war will take hard statecraft instead.

    Hugh WhiteContributor

    America’s new Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, seemed surprised by the tough talk from his Chinese counterparts when they met in Anchorage last week. He shouldn’t have been, because they were responding in an entirely predictable way to his words just moments before.

    Blinken had pressed China hard on such sensitive issues as Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and asserted America’s right to reprimand China on these issues as the leader and guardian of “the rules-based international order”.

    US Secretary of State Antony Blinken cannot have been surprised at the Chinese response. AP

    No Chinese official could fail to respond stridently to such statements. If Blinken didn’t know this, he has a lot to learn. If he did know it, then he was clearly happy to see this first high-level meeting between the Biden administration and the Chinese government descend into a slanging match that sounded like something out of the old Cold War.

    That fits everything we have heard on China from President Joe Biden and his team since the election in November. They have painted China as America’s primary strategic rival and talked up their eagerness to confront and contain it. Biden himself called it “extreme competition”.

    He wants to show US voters that he is even tougher on Beijing than Donald Trump, and rally US allies and friends to his side. This seems to be working. Many people in America and around the world – including here in Australia – have cheered Blinken’s conduct at the meeting.

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    But once two countries start talking to one another this way it is hard to stop, so where does the US-China relationship go from here? It is vital to the whole world – and especially to Australia – that America and China find a way to reverse the spiral of escalating rivalry and find a way to get along, not least because the current trajectory brings an ever-higher risk of war. How do Biden and Blinken imagine that the abuse and name-calling in Anchorage last week helps?

    The distribution of wealth and power has shifted, and there is no going back to the way things were.

    They would say, presumably, that it helps by setting out America’s non-negotiable conditions for an improvement in relations. Once these are clear to the Chinese, they seem to believe, the two countries can move forward to build a new understanding that meets those conditions. All that is required is for China to adapt to the realities as spelt out by Washington.

    It would be nice if this could happen, because it would undoubtedly make the world a better place. But it won’t happen, because China will never accept these conditions, and America cannot impose them. They will therefore lead, not to a new understanding between Washington and Beijing, but to an even more dangerous escalating rivalry between them.

    The Biden team’s vision is for the US-China relationship to return to the way it was when China acknowledged American dominance. But that was back when America’s economy was many times the size of China’s, and its military weight in Asia was incomparably stronger. Now the distribution of wealth and power has shifted fundamentally, and there is no going back to the way things were.

    So the idea that America can convince or compel China to conform to its vision of a US-led rules-based order is a fantasy. China is determined to restore its position as a great power, equal to any and subordinate to none. Even with the backing of its Indo-Pacific allies, if that is forthcoming, America would have to commit immense effort and resources to resist it.

    It would mean a new Cold War with China, just as the atmospherics in Anchorage implied. And it would be a real Cold War, just as demanding and just as dangerous as the last one. There is no evidence at all that the Biden administration, or the American people, understand the scale of the costs and risks involved, or are willing or able to shoulder them.

    And even if they were, there is no reason to assume that a new Cold War will end as happily as the old one did. America might well lose this one, because China is much stronger in the ways that really matter than the Soviet Union ever was.

    The reality is that if America is to remain a significant power in Asia it is going to have to do a deal with Beijing to build a new order that acknowledges the reality of Chinese power and accommodates some of its ambitions. That will be hard and unpleasant, but the alternative of escalating rivalry and the growing risk of a major war is worse.

    Negotiating that new order will require real statecraft, combining toughness and resolve with a degree of flexibility and some regard for the other side’s interests and positions. That is a long way from what we heard from the Biden team in Anchorage last week.

    If they don’t do better soon they will face a choice between the only two alternatives to negotiating a new order in Asia – going to war with China or withdrawing from the region. Not good outcomes, so Washington needs to change its tone.

    Lettera aperta al signor Luigi di Maio, deputato del Popolo Italiano

    ZZZ, 04.07.2020 C.A. deputato Luigi di Maio sia nella sua funzione di deputato sia nella sua funzione di ministro degli esteri ...