David A. Reilly
INTRODUCTION
1 In the post-Cold
War world, the United States has struggled to identify – and to develop a
strategy for addressing – the key threats to global security. This
struggle is most evident in the changing security strategies following
9/11 attacks of September 2001. With the strong emphasis on failing and
failed states in the 2002 US National Security Strategy1
and the Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Bush administration has
determined that "America is now threatened less by conquering states
than we are by failing ones."2
Because of innovations in technology, mobility, and communication,
calculations of risk have changed: "Enemies in the past needed great
armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now,
shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering for
less than it costs to purchase a single tank." As a result, "weak
states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national
interests as strong states."3
2 The changes to US
strategy, which in turn have the potential to change international norms
of intervention, reflect three important transformations in
international relations. First, with the end of the Cold War, the
distribution of resources (and attention) in the world has changed.
Second, globalization and interdependence are modifying interactions
between states. Third, the potential for catastrophic attacks through
the use of improved technology or small arms is greater than ever
before.
3 Illegitimate
regimes were sponsored (legitimized) by the competing alliances
throughout the Cold War. Because of this support, governments were less
concerned about taxation, and as a result, lost penetration of their
societies. Often, these governments were not concerned about segments of
their populations that lacked economic or military resources. This
neglect became disastrous when foreign support ended.
4 During the Cold
War, small arms poured into "shatterbelt regions" – areas that served as
the dividing line between hegemonic powers. The states that populate
these regions are prone to political and economic underdevelopment, and
because they are inwardly divisive and exploited from the outside they
tend to be locations where violence is prevalent. The weapons provided
by great power states remain in many of these countries, and with the
loss of external legitimacy and foreign protection, challenger groups
have been able to quickly militarize and fight for resources and
control. In conjunction with this, weapons are increasingly in the hands
of transnational non-state actors, posing a threat to neighboring
states and populations.
5 In an attempt to
gain the limited external resources that remain, or to establish
legitimacy from within, many of these states have made rapid attempts to
democratize. Often, these efforts are made without adequate
infrastructure or the cultural norms to facilitate democratic processes.
In the long run, these efforts can be destabilizing and
counterproductive.4
6 Moreover, the lack
of oversight of weapons of mass destruction has led to the fear that
large-scale violence is a possibility. With the second phase of
decolonization following the break-up of the Soviet Union, weapons
diffusion became a major problem. David Carment highlights the
perceptions of insecurity within these countries: "The borders they had
to defend were arbitrary; their societies were usually diverse in
composition; and few leaders had experience in building inclusive civic
and democratic cultures. In essence, the security threats of these
states were and are as much internal as external."5
Compounding these issues was the fact that weapons of mass destruction
were housed in some of these countries, and the resources to maintain
them dwindled. As a result, limited oversight of installations created
the potential for technology or weapons to fall into the wrong hands.
7 Each of these
transformations has modified how failing and failed states are perceived
– and how they behave – in the international system. In this essay I
make three main arguments. First, failing and failed states must be
understood from a two-level game perspective. Their domestic conditions
shape their international behavior, and their international
circumstances exacerbate their internal failings. Second, established
states and failing/failed states engage in different functions.
Established states are focused on state expansion activities, while
failing and failed states are attempting to undergo the process of
state-building. Finally, I argue that this problem of failing states is
not going away; more to the point, a collision course between these two
types of states is inevitable.
Why the Concern About Failing States?
8 The inability
of states to function effectively is not new; however, it is
increasingly prevalent and, accordingly, is subject to greater scrutiny
and research. Among a growing set of analyses, research by the Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity
uses a "Fragility Matrix" to highlight high risk states, and emphasizes
the continued attention to international conflict prevention and
post-conflict reconstruction.6 Work by the Fund for Peace includes
a "Failed State Index" that identifies risk of conflict: thirty-five
countries fall into the high risk category for 2008.7 The State Failure Project
examines the propensity for political transformation in states, and
more recently has begun to assess relationships between governments and
international terrorist organizations.8
These types of attempts to quantify risk and to identify trouble spots
are progressively linked to policy decisions and to recognition of the
importance of failing states.
9 That said, one
implication of the failing state's dysfunction is that it is less
likely to pose a direct threat to other states. In fact, research has
indicated that failing states engage in interstate violence less
frequently than established, stable states.9
However, some argue that failing states can serve as a breeding ground
for terrorist activity. Violent organizations can seek to create bases
within the borders of failing and failed states, free from oversight and
interference. The ability of al-Qaeda to operate within
Afghanistan's territory prior to 11 September 2001, offered an example
of how a failed state, wittingly or unwittingly, may harbor terrorists.
This link has been challenged in research by Ken Menkhaus, who argues
that the relationship between terrorism and failed states has been
misdiagnosed. Accordingly, we do not have a clear sense of the kind of
operating environment a terrorist network needs, or the resulting
understanding of how to combat the terrorist threat as it relates to
state failure.10
10
Traditionally, because failing states are unlikely to challenge the
international status quo, they have been ignored and overlooked. With
the 9/11 attacks, however, the inability of these states to manage their
borders was perceived by many as a threat to established state
security. As a result, United States security strategy was modified, and
in conjunction with these changes, international norms were challenged.
The argument for pre-emptive war was made by the Bush administration,
and used as a justification for the subsequent attack of Iraq in 2003.
11 In the 2006 U.S. Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Bush administration's strategy on addressing failing and failed states is detailed: Physical
sanctuaries can stretch across an entire sovereign state, be limited to
specific ungoverned or ill-governed areas in an otherwise functioning
state, or cross national borders. In some cases the government wants to
exercise greater effective sovereignty over its lands and maintain
control within its borders but lacks the necessary capacity. We will
strengthen the capacity of such War on Terror partners to reclaim full
control of their territory through effective police, border, and other
security forces as well as functioning systems of justice. To further
counter terrorist exploitation of under-governed lands, we will promote
effective economic development to help ensure long-term stability and
prosperity.It continues:In failing states or
states emerging from conflict, the risks are significant. Spoilers can
take advantage of instability to create conditions terrorists can
exploit. We will continue to work with foreign partners and
international organizations to help prevent conflict and respond to
state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations,
reconstruction, and stabilization so that countries in transition can
reach a sustainable path to peace, democracy, and prosperity. Where
physical havens cross national boundaries, we will continue to work with
the affected countries to help establish effective cross-border
control. Yet some countries will be reluctant to fulfill their sovereign
responsibilities to combat terrorist-related activities within their
borders. In addition to cooperation and sustained diplomacy, we will
continue to partner with the international community to persuade states
to meet their obligations to combat terrorism and deny safe haven under
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.These policies have
broad-reaching implications that affect the notion of state rights. To
understand the effects of the failing state, and how it is addressed, it
is necessary to define it, to clarify its behavior, and to speculate on
how it will be affected by new norms of international interaction.
What is a Failing State?
12 The
literature on failing states defines them by describing the process of
state failure, or by comparing or analogizing to collapsed states, rogue
states, fragile states, weak states, and quasi-states. Rotberg takes a
more basic approach: rather than defining it, he argues that, "You know
it when you see it."11
This typifies analytical problems inherent in the literature: cause and
effect are often conflated in such a way that the explanation becomes
tautological. As Carment argues, Many analyses point
to fundamentally different causes of state failure; others rely on the
monitoring of background factors and enabling conditions that are
associated with the risk of conflict but do not themselves provide
accurate information on the probability of specific events leading to
failure. Still others do not distinguish between causality and
correlation, while others are engrossed in issue-specific problems that
are symptomatic of state weakness and human insecurity — e.g. illicit
gun flows, child soldiers, black market activity and AIDS — problems
that are by themselves significant and important but not necessarily associated with or causes of failure.12In
short, in the literature there is a failure to distinguish clearly
between cause and effect, and a failure to distinguish between what
failing states are and what they do.
13 Using behavior to explain failing, violent states would be an exercise in tautology. The "shatterbelt" literature13
comes dangerously close to this result by defining a shatterbelt region
as an area of high violence. The prediction of future violence is then
predicated on past behavior. This research is useful insofar as it
begins to identify the conditions that lead to this violence, but the
theory and logic are underdeveloped.
14 Colonialism is frequently used as a criterion for "high risk propensity,"14
and there is good reason for its use. States that suffered from
colonialism are said to have been left legacies of institutional
underdevelopment, country borders that do not correspond with national
ones, and traditions of domination that inhibit political and economic
growth. However, the fates that all states were cast as colonies are not
the same. Colonial legacies had mixed results in terms of subsequent
political and economic growth, and their post-colonial behavior reflects
this.15
15 The
designation of 'Third World' or 'developing world' uses the attribute of
economic level to offer insight into state behavior. But this
convention does not begin with a clearly established criterion—some
cutoff point, for example, that would logically affect state
processes. There is certainly promise in this approach, however. Many
studies find that Third World state behavior can be grouped together in
ways that reveal interesting dynamics.16
The reason for limiting the criteria to one attribute, however, is
unclear. Unless there is some theoretical link between economic level
and the particular behavior, such a criterion is arbitrary and
unnecessary.17
16 As an
alternative, we might differentiate the failing state from established
states by recognizing that the basic function of the failing state is
different from other states: its leaders are engaging in state-building
rather than state expansion activities. The need to create the state
institutions, processes, and legitimacy affects failing state leaders'
motivations, fears, and decision-making constraints. They
suffer from an "insecurity dilemma" where state security takes
precedence over national security. In other words, the leader is more
concerned with preserving his own life and position than with developing
the resources of the state.
17 The repressive behavior of failing and failed states is a result of what has been termed the insecurity dilemma.18
The anarchy of the domestic environment leads the ruling regime to
employ a "self-help" strategy of domestic coercion in response to
threats from domestic challengers and neighboring states. Cooperation is
not expected to endure because the state cannot reinforce agreements
with economic incentives, appeals to national unity, or through a
reliance on widely accepted "rules of the game." All of the actors
involved — domestic opposition groups, external challengers, and the
state itself — recognize this circumstance. As a result, the state has
the incentive to first, signal to others that it is willing to use
force, second, be preemptive in reducing threats or potential threats,
and finally, to take risks given that the status quo is a condition of
insecurity.
18 The
insecurity dilemma is unique to these states. It also shapes their
conflict behavior. According to this perspective, failing and failed
states should be considered as uniquely inclined toward aggression
against their own populations. Failing and failed states are not the
only states that resort to violent repression in the world but they are
the only states that are trapped in a cycle of violence. For this
reason, they deserve special attention.
19 The failing
state lacks other sources of power/legitimacy beyond force, what
Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer refer to as normative, material,
and coercive power (coercive including legal/institutional as well as
regulatory).19
They have no community of feeling based on self-consciousness of a
common nationality. They have no established rules of law and
governance. They have no ability or right to extract from the population
and, as a result, develop its infrastructure. And, if the state fails,
it also lacks a monopoly of coercion.
20 To consider
the difference between what a state is and what it does, we can consider
the difference between juridical and empirical sovereignty. A state
cannot fail the criteria of juridical sovereignty. State sovereignty was
to be afforded to each UN member and defined in the following manner:
"1) that states are juridically equal, 2) that each state enjoys the
rights inherent in full sovereignty, 3) that the personality of the
state is respected, as well as its territorial integrity and political
independence, and 4) that they should, under international order, comply
faithfully with its international duties and obligations."20
21 In contrast,
empirical sovereignty refers to the ability of the state to function. It
presupposes the establishment of legitimate political order, the
fostering and cultivation of national unity, facilitation of economic
development, and that the state monopolizes coercion. A state can fail
in each of these criteria, and the failure of these reflects the
inability of that state to function effectively on both the domestic and
international levels.
22 Failing
states lack assets of state capacity — national unity, political
stability, and economic resources — which translate into state power.
Their deficiency of material, normative, and legal/institutional power
necessitates the use of force within the domestic environment during
times of crises. Coercive power is the one asset remaining for these
states: when turmoil surfaces, coercion becomes their only solution.
23 A second
category of states lacks even the monopolization over coercion. Failed
states are instances where the regime cannot lay claim to rule based on a
preponderance of power – even that asset is contested. Examples include
Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Somalia, and Sudan. These countries are
steeped in civil war with no clear ruling authority.
24 As a result,
failing and failed states dominate the headlines of international news.
Domestic problems in the form of challenges to state unity, to political
regimes, and to leaders themselves frequently result in conflict within
borders as well as across them. In these instances, conditions of
political instability, cultural fragmentation, and economic hardship
combine to generate domestic volatility. The result is often violence
between groups struggling for power and authority. Leaders attempt to
reduce domestic challenges by employing state terror and repressing
specific opposition groups.
25 For failing
and established states alike, violence often stems from the attempt to
gain control. What is different about circumstances for failing and
established states, however, is the level of uncertainty they face. The
failing state's control over its own country — population, resources,
and territory — is precarious. Threats to the regime in power stem from,
and are exacerbated by, the fact that its legitimacy is in doubt. This
is a result of the inability of government to satisfy the basic needs of
the population. It is a result of ethnic or religious divides within
the population, and the fact that certain groups feel underrepresented,
ignored, or even attacked by government. It is a result of the fact that
political institutions and practices are either new or rejected as
illegitimate, and elements of society have not accepted the "rules of
the game." The decision-makers within the ruling regime are faced with
the task of building the state while simultaneously dealing with
challenges from domestic opposition.
26 In contrast,
the fact of domestic legitimacy and authority enables the established
state to expand its sphere of influence and control. The growth of the
state leads to greater interdependence in the international system
through trade and interaction. This is not to say that established
states never experience domestic strife; rather, even when strife does
occur the unity of a culturally homogenous society, the pacifying
effects of wealth and prosperity, and faith in the tradition of a
(relatively) long-standing political system serve to reduce the threats
to decision-makers.
27 Leaders of
established states are most concerned about threats to national security
— threats that are usually externally based. These may not necessarily
take the form of armed aggressors: changing alliances, trade blocs, and
the rise and decline of other powerful countries may compromise the
interests of the state and generate uncertainty in the international
system. As a result, much established-state conflict involves coalitions
of countries joining forces to preserve the status quo, promoting
widely accepted norms such as democracy and human rights, or keeping the
peace where there is turmoil that threatens their interests. Given that
powerful states tend to cast their nets widely, their interests are
many, and therefore their scope of concern is global. Interventions in
areas where their interests are at stake often necessitate the use of
force to stabilize and regulate the situation. For failing state
leaders, however, the greatest concern is for the persistence of the
regime or even for their own survival. The integrity of territorial
borders and the independence of the country — once established — are
virtually assured by international norms and practices. The most
proximate threats, then, are generated by their own domestic
environment, in the form of challenges to authority.
How Does the Insecurity Dilemma Result in Failure?
28 The lack of
state capacity shapes the behavior of the failing state. Research on
state capacity usually begins with the expectation that states have some
combination of the following characteristics: a territory within which
an authority makes decisions — if necessary, by force;21 a community of feeling based on self-consciousness of a common nationality;22 established rules of law and governance;23 and the right to extract from its population and thus develop its infrastructure.24
Those states at highest risk of failure lack all but the first of
these. That is, there is no feeling of unity, no established "rules of
the game," and no resources from which to build an infrastructure. That
leaves the monopolization of coercion, which when used overtly and
regularly is evidence of illegitimacy.25
29 State power
is comprised of components of force, cultural unity, political rule of
law, and resources. Dallin and Breslauer suggest that social and
political control is developed through a system of sanctions that
consists of three types: normative power, which includes socialization
and education; material power, manifested in incentives; and coercive
power, which includes fines, penalties, terror, and regulatory and
police power.26
I argue that coercive power is actually two forms of power —
legal/institutional (legal disincentives, fines, penalties) and
repressive (terror, regulatory and police repression). Dallin and
Breslauer themselves hint at this distinction by distinguishing terror
from other forms of coercion, and noting that, "Of all the instruments
in the arsenal of the state, terror is the ultimate weapon, to be
applied when all else has failed."27
30 When states
lack cultural, political, and resource capacity, they must necessarily
fall back on the use of force during times of turmoil. Accordingly, the
failing state dilemma can be conceptualized as one in which the
deficiency of power in other areas necessitates the use of force as a
strategy for control. This distinguishes the aggression by failing
states from aggression by established states in that failing states have
virtually no other course of action. Their lack of alternatives to
resolve conflict puts them at high risk of violence whenever domestic or
international unrest develops. Established states, in contrast, have
options such as appealing to nationalist sentiment, "buying off"
disgruntled groups with social programs or tax incentives, or relying on
the due process of law and the judicial process as the legitimate
course of action for those with grievances. They also feel less of a
need on the international front to take risks in order to achieve
short-term gains and domestic support.
31 The failed
state suffers greater uncertainty than even the insecurity dilemma that
consumes failing states. It is in the throes of civil war, where even
the monopolization of coercion is challenged. That failed states,
engaged in civil wars, should be more violent than other states is not a
novel concept. However, the idea that states on the verge of failure
are more likely to resort to violence – and to be motivated to violence
for different reasons than for other states – is an untested
proposition.
32 The conflict-generating scenario within the failing state mirrors the international scenario described by neo-realists.28
Given a lack of legitimacy and an absence of alternative means for
addressing domestic dissent, the internal dynamics of the state are
essentially anarchic. There are no generally accepted legal or
institutional frameworks that provide systematic, orderly responses to
grievances. There is no sense of nationalism that offers the potential
to unify the population. There are no discretionary resources available
as incentives for coalition building or for buying-off disgruntled
groups. In short, there is an absence of established authority that can
mitigate challenges to the state.
33 As a result,
the ruling regime is concerned, first and foremost, with survival. There
is no guarantee of cooperation on the part of domestic factions.
Leaders expect that coalitions are transitory and therefore they are
concerned with "self-help": they are responsive to threats, attempt to
build their military might in order to be capable of responding to
domestic challenges, and they assume an aggressive posture toward
dissent.
34 The concern
for survival leads the ruling regime to focus on its security
environment, which involves domestic opposition groups and potentially
aggressive neighboring states. This is where the insecurity dilemma
differs from the neo-realist view; it is the anarchy of the immediate
security environment, not the anarchy of the international system, which
motivates the failing state to become aggressive. Given that the
failing state's only power is that of coercion, it will attempt to
guarantee its survival through the use of force against its neighbors
and its own population.
35 In contrast, neo-realists argue that decisions regarding international conflict behavior stem from the concern for national
security. The anarchic international environment provides no protection
or guarantee of security for individual states. As a result, states are
motivated to ensure their own survival through military means. States
attempt to enhance their power and press their advantages against weaker
states to improve their safety, and are assumed to act unitarily in the
interest of the country at large. In short, conflict behavior is about
power relations between states and the threats that are generated from these.
The Effects of Globaliztion
36 The process of globalization can be thought of as a reinforcing cycle in which:
- Innovations in transportation and communication technologies lead to new public demands;
- Government is pressured to identify new solutions to public demands, many of which have transnational facets;
- Governments must either engage in
interdependent action such as trade or exchange in order to serve the
public needs, or engage in some form of conflict. It may repress the
demands of the public, or it may engage in imperialistic violence abroad
to meet the public demands.
- >If the state chooses the interdependent route, there are new technological innovations that result and the cycle repeats.
This cycle contributes to the process of
state failure in three ways. First, it leads to a greater diffusion of
information and ideas. Neighbors matter more, and states are held to a
higher standard than ever before. Public awareness resulting from media,
the efforts of nongovernmental organizations, and the presence of
international organizations, is improved. Second, there is greater
pressure on ruling regimes, especially those that lack legitimacy. State
building is a time-intensive process. The insecurity dilemma is
becoming more pronounced because states do not have the luxury of time
to develop capacity. There is more international pressure, and greater
expectations for citizen rights and inclusion. Whereas Western states
had the ability to address cultural divides, extraction, and
centralization before mass participation, failing states are
increasingly pressured to include their citizenry in an open process of
governmental transformation. Third, there are changing international
norms of human rights protections and democratic governance that limit
the strategies of failing state governments, or that cost them
legitimacy should they choose to violate these.
37 Robert Kaplan
suggests that current conflicts are a harbinger for "The Coming
Anarchy": a world divided between chaos and order.29
Although the industrialized world is not likely to be threatened in the
near future, the Third World is already suffering from a number of
societal dilemmas, four of which are directly related to the diffusion
of conflict across state boundaries, and exacerbated by state failure.
The first – illogical boundaries – results from the historical process
of colonization. Imperial powers divided up the Third World according to
their own needs and interests rather than on the basis of any ethnic,
religious, or historical lines of demarcation. Most of these borders
were retained during the process of decolonization, and as a result,
incompatible populations are fenced within the territorial boundaries of
these countries.
38 A second argument presented by Kaplan is based on Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis.
With the inability of governments to organize their populations,
citizens are affiliating with cultural groupings that are not confined
by state borders. As the loyalties of individuals turn from the state to
some other type of community, their tolerance for others within their
state decreases. The result is conflict that escalates within and across
states without regard for traditional boundaries.
39 The third
problem stems from the scarcity of resources, and is based on Tad
Homer-Dixon's work on environmental degradation and conflict.30
He suggests that poor countries are likely to be less capable of
dealing with the pressures of environmental scarcity, and hence
"environmentally induced conflicts" are likely to grow in the developing
world in coming years. Cross-border violence is predicted as a result
of scarcity disputes, population displacement in the form of
environmental refugees, and group-identity conflicts brought on by
environmental change. These issues are more likely to be acute in
failing or failed states because of the inability of these governments
to manage the social conflicts that emerge.
40 The fourth –
the transformation of war – reveals the extent to which states have lost
their monopoly over coercion. Events of violent conflict in the modern
era, according to Martin van Creveld, are likely to occur on a smaller
scale because of advancements in technology.31
The ability to place nuclear warheads in suitcase-sized casings, to
attack large numbers of people with easily transportable (and relatively
easily manufactured) nerve gasses and chemical weapons, and to produce
bombs that can destroy crowded buses and buildings all reflect the fact
that technology has enabled individuals to possess weapons of
significance. Whereas the state needed to mobilize its entire population
and resources for warfare during the time of the levée en masse,32
much smaller groups are now able to wreak havoc on populations. As a
result, terrorist groups are able to mobilize, organize, and challenge
states more effectively than ever before. They do not require the state
apparatus to make war; in many ways they are effective and elusive
because they originate from no single location.
41 As if
Kaplan's depiction of the future were not dire enough, many would add
that the effects of globalization are likely to exacerbate the problem
of state failure. As improvements in communication and transportation
technologies lead to increases in flows of information and resources,
researchers have begun to examine the effects of globalization and
integration on a variety of state behaviors. From these studies, a
fundamental disagreement has emerged: globalization is argued by some to
lead inevitably to a consensus on social and political order that will
signify the "End of History,"33
while others contend that increased interaction between cultures and
nationalist groups will result in conflict and a "Clash of
Civilizations."34 The two sides of this dispute have been characterized as "Jihad vs. McWorld" and
the "Lexus and the Olive Tree," a tug-of-war between the
assimilationist nature of capitalism and the fundamentalist tendencies
of religious and tribal groups.35
In either case, there is general agreement that these changes will have
implications for global peace and security. Whether international order
or terrorism and violence is the likely result of globalization – and
whether policies can be enacted to mitigate this process – will have a
profound effect on international relations in coming years.
42 Regardless of
how one views the process of globalization, it is clear that
populations are more aware of what is going on in the surrounding world.
The relative gains, discontents, and strategies of neighbors are
observed and evaluated. Threats to the well being, prosperity, and way
of life of communities are perceived at all levels, not just by leaders.
Governments are increasingly being held accountable for their ability
to protect and provide for their citizens.36
The result, if the ruling regime does not meet these growing
expectations, is domestic strife. The regime, in turn, may be forced to
repress internal challenges or to divert the attention of a dissatisfied
public through international conflict.
43 A second
issue of debate within the globalization literature involves the
importance of location within a globalized world. Liberals such as
Thomas Friedman suggest that the importance of local context will be
diminished as international ties are extended: "In the Cold War system,
the most likely threat . . . was from your neighbor coming over . . .
That threat has not been eliminated today, but, for the moment, it has
been diminished in many parts of the world".37
A recent study assessing the process of transition for post-communist
states, however, indicates just the opposite: location is one of the
most important determinants of political and economic change.38
Such findings have fueled speculation that regional dynamics and
neighbor-effects will continue to provide the clearest indicators of
interstate conflict.
44 One area of
research that assumes that location is of critical importance examines
the possibility of "shatterbelts." These are backward and fragmented
regions; the states that comprise them suffer from depressed political
and economic systems. Because these states are inwardly divisive and
exploited from the outside, they are characterized as hostile and
violent. It is suggested that their temperaments leave these countries
displaced from their neighbors, their regions, and the system at large.
In addition, there is assumed to be a regional dynamic whereby the
aggressiveness of individual states is contagious, leading to violence
that spills over borders. The probability of conflict within
shatterbelts, for all of these reasons, is assumed to be significantly
greater than in non-shatterbelt areas. In essence, the problem of state
failure and collapse may be growing into a regional, rather than
state-based, problem.
45 In what may
be the only rigorous, systematic investigation of shatterbelts to date,
Paul Hensel and Paul Diehl describe a number of important
characteristics of these "at risk" states. Their study provides
empirical support for the proposition that shatterbelts generate a
disproportionate number of militarized disputes, and it reveals that
internal conflicts are more common in shatterbelt regions. In fact,
shatterbelts are twice as likely as other regions to experience
militarized disputes. The intensity and duration of conflicts in these
areas are also significantly greater than in non-shatterbelt regions.39
46 The violent
behavior attributed to shatterbelt states may not correspond with
failing and failed states. Even though states within shatterbelts are
assumed to be more conflict-prone because of their domestic
shortcomings, others have argued that failing states are not likely to
be threatened by their surrounding environment because norms of
international sovereignty guarantee their persistence. As Robert Jackson
argues, even though theories of international relations assume that
states must fend for themselves, the current international system
dictates that "[t]o be a sovereign state today one needs only to have
been a formal colony yesterday. All other considerations are
irrelevant."40
The implication is that all states, whether failing or established,
have very little to fear in terms of external challenges because they
are protected by international convention. In contrast with the past,
when "small and weak states had to survive as best they could by their
own efforts,"41
the current system is much different. In today's world, "weak,
marginal, or insubstantial states are now exempted from the power
contest at least in part and treated as international protectorates. . .
. The weakness or backwardness of countries is no longer a
justification for conquest or colonialism."42
47 This norm of
non-intervention has changed with the Bush administration's response to
failing states. The US has made it clear that it will be pre-emptive in
addressing perceived threats as a result of dysfunctional states. In
recent years, its airstrikes across the Afghani-Pakistani border provide
evidence of a willingness to operate unilaterally and without regard
for the concerns of other states. But the US is not alone in taking this
stance. The International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty concluded in 2001 that, "States . . . had a 'responsibility
to protect' their citizens and others living in their territory. If they
failed that responsibility, the international community had both a
right and an obligation to intervene and reverse the consequences."43
48 Where does
this leave failing states? The additional external pressure of the
threat of intervention exacerbates the insecurity dilemma. This in turn
will undoubtedly affect the external behavior of these states. Although
there is a limit, given the lack of resources, on the extent to which
failing states can turn their violence outward, their coercive behavior
may spike as a result of external threats. More likely, we will see a
higher number of these states collapse under the additional pressure and
lack of legitimacy. This in turn will affect refugee flows, the
stability of neighboring states, and the need for established states (or
international organizations) to engage in peace-building efforts.
Finally, state collapse may empower and embolden non-state actors as
challengers to the status quo. The recent rise of pirate attacks,
corrupt mafia-type organizations, and international terrorists may be
further spurred by the continued failure of states.
49 Without a
doubt, the problem of failing states is not going away. As established
states modify the Westphalian notion of sovereignty to protect against
the limitations of failing states, the unintended consequence may be a
rise in the importance of state failure to how states interact. The
process of globalization has increased interactions and heightened
interdependence; this in turn increases the relevance of failing states
to their neighbors, their region, and to the stability of the system at
large. Failing states are engaged in fundamentally different activities
from established states, so we must consider the difference between the
two as one of sequence or type rather than degree. As established states
continue to expand, and as globalization reduces the distance between
states, networks and communities will interact with the failing state
environment, and the individuals within them. Because of the differences
between these and established states, friction will result.
David A. Reilly is chair of
the Department of Political Science and director of the International
Studies Program at Niagara University, New York State.
![People protest against a state-at-home order issued by Colorado Governor Jared Polis to curb the coronavirus outbreak on April 19, 2020 in Denver, US [AP/David Zalubowski]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/c932e98a556e492e8ca37d51e4b80851_18.jpeg?resize=770%2C513)
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