Italy
has been one of the hardest hit countries in the world during the
Covid-19 outbreak and there are significant concerns about the impact
the pandemic will have on the Italian economy. Roberto Orsi writes
that the Eurozone is rapidly heading toward a point where it will
either have to adopt radical new measures to accommodate countries like
Italy or risk seeing the currency bloc break apart.
The Covid-19 pandemic is accelerating Italy’s slide towards its
economic and financial endgame. While before the pandemic the country
already found itself in a precarious balance between high debt and no
growth, this shock is precipitating the situation by bursting the
various arrangements and tactics that both Rome and Brussels/Frankfurt
were employing to create a screen of credibility and creditworthiness.
The discussion about the future of the Eurozone (whether there is one,
for whom, and how) is back again.
A new economic environment
The pandemic is still in its growing stage as this piece is being
written, yet it is already clear that it is going to be a crisis of
historical dimensions. It will not be over by the end of April or May
2020. This means the world economy will be virtually brought to a
standstill for a whole quarter. Afterwards, even if a recovery will
surely take place, and barring a second wave of contagion later on, any
return to normality will be complicated and relatively slow-paced.
It is difficult to estimate the death toll of such a pandemic and the
scale of human suffering deriving directly or indirectly from the
disease, and even more so the economic and social costs, but, judging by
the unprecedented steps taken in all developed countries to prop up the
economy, the economic and financial burden will be colossal.
States will have to borrow enormous sums in order to avoid financial
collapse, thus expanding national debt by a large margin. In the
2008-2009 crisis, national debts ballooned by 30% to 50% of GDP or more,
depending on the country, in a few years. It appears that this crisis
will require a much larger effort. How much larger, nobody knows yet, as
it will depend on the duration of the pandemic. Still, it can be expected
that major economies will shrink by 8-10% in 2020, with Goldman Sachs
forecasting -9% in Q1 and -34% in Q2 for the United States.
National debt expansion as the way forward?
Former ECB Governor Mario Draghi has argued in a recent piece in the Financial Times
that high sovereign debt/GDP ratios will become the norm, at least for a
while. He is certainly correct about this, but the quality of the debt
and the underlying national economies are not the same for all, and
markets know it.
The stakes are very clear: there are some countries, most notably
Italy, which cannot expand their euro-denominated debt by 30% or 40% of
their rapidly shrinking GDP,
without explicit or implicit EU guarantees for the creditors. Without
such a European guarantee, markets will not allow interest rates on
Italy’s debt to remain extremely low, a requirement to keep interest
payments at an acceptable level.
Alternatively, the creditors will mostly become the ECB system or the
Italian banks, or both, (this has already been happening for a number
of years). Italy, a country which has not even recovered its pre-2008
GDP, can hardly be expected to repay any more national debt under the
same system of Eurozone rules which have been in place up to now, even
with the significant formal and informal amendments and innovative
practices of the Draghi era.

Italy’s Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, at a European Council meeting in February 2020, Credit: European Union
Currently, the approach to the crisis is the following: EU limits to
budget deficits are lifted, at least for 2020, and the national
governments can spend as much as necessary, issuing new national debt;
the ECB will provide the liquidity to buy this through the banks, or
directly; the ECB will keep interest rates as low as possible to
minimise interest payments; later on, in the next few years, the debt
burden will have to be reduced by growing the economy and/or repaying
the debt, and budget deficit restrictions will be reinstated.
However, with the massive debt issuing that is now looming, who will support Italy when the debt/GDP ratio climbs from 135% in 2019
to 170%? To 180%? Those are the levels which triggered the debt crisis
in Greece after 2010. Who believes that Italy will grow at an
accelerated pace in the next decade? On the basis of what
considerations? It appears therefore that the above-described public
finance approach to this crisis will not work for Italy. The country’s
leadership knows it, and they are looking for a different path.
Solidarity and the Eurozone’s architecture
The most straightforward way to stabilise Italy’s financial future
revolves around the thorny question of the Eurozone’s mutual solidarity,
its conditions and its limits. To understand this, one needs to go back
to the question of the Eurozone’s fundamental architecture and ethos.
If the national debts were pooled or shared in some way, or monetised
by the ECB, part of Italy’s debt would be paid, in the long run, also by
other euro members’ taxpayers, and such a European formal guarantee
would reassure the markets, provided that Europe as a whole remains a
credible debtor.
Debt pooling, whatever the financial arrangement, would require the
overhaul of the Eurozone as it was initially conceived, to make it, by
necessity, something that many within Europe, both governments and
citizens, do not want. The Eurozone was supposed to be an exclusive club
of high-performance economies, run with strict rules mirroring the best
practices of the Bundesbank, and the fiscal restraint of
northern European economies. The euro was supposed to make every economy
more efficient internally and more competitive externally, by inducing
structural changes to be managed by national governments under the
supervision of EU authorities, with the goal of an increasing
convergence in governance standards and results. Still, the underlying
political agreement in the Maastricht Treaty called for a separation of
national budgets, and the ultimate national responsibility for sovereign
debt.
Instead, the results after two decades, whether or not caused by the
euro, appear to be: 1) a persistent, even increasing divergence in the
public finance performance in the North and in the South of the
continent; 2) a perceived stagnation and/or worsening of living
standards in numerous parts of the continent; 3) increased political
pressure on the EU and the Eurozone project calling for radical reforms,
going either towards debt pooling (sometimes unconditional), or towards
the dismantling of the Eurozone/exit of single countries.
Whichever way one may look at it, it appears that the original project and architecture of the Eurozone is no longer tenable, if all
members are to remain within it. The Eurozone as a single currency bloc
may perhaps be able to survive in some form, but in order to do so, it
must, at least temporarily (but still, for a long time, possibly
decades): a) embrace the idea that it has failed to be the
above-mentioned exclusive club of well-functioning economies; b)
consider the Stability and Growth Pact as overhauled and no
longer applicable; c) agree on a new identity and mission; d) agree on a
new legal and political structure, one which goes beyond the concept of
separation of national budgets.
The last point is the most difficult one. In principle, debt pooling
could be agreed if there were a shared vision of what to do in the
future in terms of macroeconomic and fiscal policies, and if there were
enough chance of success. Such chances are not visible to most people.
Besides, there is no clear political vision for further integration of
EU or Eurozone members, as it is rather unavoidable, out of political
and organisational considerations, that debt pooling would require a
harmonised fiscal policy, and hence some sort of political union.
There could be partial forms of pooling, for instance for bonds
related to particular kinds of investments (but who controls how the
money will be spent? how can rules be enforced?), or bonds issued by a
group of Eurozone members, but not all, for instance a “southern
alliance” with France at the helm. On the other hand, numerous political
leaders in the North
have already expressed rather clearly the view that they wish to keep
the ultimate separation of national budgets as a non-negotiable element
of the Eurozone.
North vs. South?
Many in Italy regard resistance against debt pooling as a want of European solidarity,
and a failure to live up to the political and ethical commitment from
other EU members. However, should EU solidarity be unconditional? While
it is certainly good to show solidarity at a time of acute distress (as
is happening now), infinite and unconditional solidarity is ethically
wrong. Once the emergency is over, it is not unfair to ask every country
to return to a path of economic and financial sustainability. Is
financial sustainability not the norm of every state budget, or even
every household?
The possible existence of areas of the Eurozone permanently depending
on transfers from other regions would be unfair and it would certainly
generate, as is already happening, fierce political resistance.
Solidarity should always be conditional in the long run. Italy is right
in demanding solidarity (it will get it for as long as the pandemic
continues), but there are many in Italy who are wrong in refusing to
discuss and negotiate conditions, insisting on an incorrect solidarity
concept.
If Italy’s position in demanding unconditioned solidarity
is incorrect, the probable conditions to be put forth by many in the
northern part of the Eurozone in case of national debt restructuring or
another form of financial support for distressed countries, have
problems of their own. Most notably, the structural adjustments which
would be likely included in the conditions of any ESM activation, such
as tax hikes and spending cuts, as already observed during the Greek
crisis, will cause social and economic pain as a result of a longer and
deeper recession, and produce political side-effects, such as the
further spread of Euroscepticism, which are seldom taken into account,
thus in the end worsening the EU’s political crisis.
Moreover, it is questionable whether such structural reforms would
actually deliver meaningful, long-lasting results, and allow a country
like Italy to return to a path of economic growth and financial
sustainability. Spain and Portugal have certainly managed to recover
from the 2008-2009 crash while implementing reforms which came as
conditions to access EU support, but they did so by massively expanding
their national debt and running high deficits for most of the past decade (Spain from 39.5% of GDP in 2008 to 95.5% in 2019; Portugal
from 71.7% in 2008 to 117.7% in 2019), while Italy, as its debt already
stood at 99.8% of GDP in 2008, was unable to do the same. Moreover,
structural reforms are not addressing one of the most important economic
issues in Italy, namely the now practically inevitable demographic
collapse, which, according to a study by the Bank of Italy, will be a formidable headwind for the country from now onwards, leading to a scenario of permanent recession.
Both main positions now shaping the intra-EU debate, the one
demanding unconditional solidarity and the abandonment of most metrics
of economic performance, as well as the one pretending to have the right
(technical) solutions for Italy’s and the Eurozone’s problems, are
wrong. If some kind of solution can emerge from the current predicament,
it should be one starting from the acknowledgment that the dominant way
to conceptualise the Eurozone’s governance has historically failed.
It has failed because it was grounded on the illusion that law (in
the form of international treaties initially envisaged in the late
1980s, and thus in a completely different economic, social, and
demographic landscape) can predict and regulate any occurrence in
political and economic life, indefinitely. It has failed because of
excessive juridification as the most obvious degeneration of post-war Ordnungspolitik.
If such a failure were to be acknowledged, however, the conclusion
may arise that the only convenient path forward is an orderly démontage
of the currency bloc. This option is surely under consideration by
some, particularly in the North, even if it implies huge political costs
and great uncertainties. Exceptional times favour exceptional
decisions. The Covid-19 pandemic offers a unique opportunity for radical
moves. If the Eurozone project is to be abandoned, now is the time.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the
position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School
of Economics.
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About the author
Roberto Orsi – University of Tokyo
Roberto Orsi is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo.
I agree on all of this document but the end.
How can you say that the EU must change the basic foundations of its uinion and do not show us your idea about the desing of the next union ?
If you think that the structure of this union is wrong, evidently you have an idea of how it should be.
I think that this must be part of your paper.
I hear from many quarters that this union is wrong and it should be overhauled. I agree.
But I have also produced a paper where I explain how the next union should be done.
I proposed, years ago, what I think is the Alternative for Europe, but I did not meet much success.
Now most actors of this drama are crying and fighting each other, but not much serious thinking is done on this New Europe.
I wish people of academia would want to fill this gap